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Abstract: The populist communication model of perceiving journalists as “the enemies of the 
state”, presented in the political communication of the 45th US President Donald Trump, seems 
to be not only reserved for the US but has become a trend for populist leaders worldwide. Such 
rhetoric has been revitalized by the recent rise of populism in Western Europe, fostered in 
Central and Eastern Europe and recognized in the local media landscape in Serbia. This paper 
compares the communication models of US President Donald Trump and the Serbian Presi-
dent Aleksandar Vučić as directed toward journalists. The results show that these leaders use a 
similar communication pattern: they favour divisive issues, stressing a friendly vs. unpatriotic 
media, alienating the media outlets and contributing to the further polarisation in media and 
society. This research is based on a qualitative analysis of 12 press conferences, including media 
statements chosen for their unique interactions with media representatives.
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Introduction
In his foreword to Richard H. Rovere’s book Senator Joe McCarthy, Arthur M. Schlesinger 
wrote: “Once the season of paranoia is over, we look back with certain disbelief at our 
spasms of irrationality. Later generations reading about Joe McCarthy must wonder what 
in the world their ancestors had been smoking in the 1950s.”1 In this same reflective man-
ner, it is likely that future generations will ask how it had been possible, despite absolute 
globalization, an “open” era of almost unquestionable facts and under the universal inclu-
sion of social networks, that journalists have been marginalized by the political establish-
ment. These questions most easily arise while highlighting the obvious instances of media 
in the United States “where antagonism toward journalists has already been a regular 
feature of political discourse.”2 Journalists feel this antagonism while facing the “venom-
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jected to racist and misogynistic taunts”.4 As writer and media analyst Michael Massing 
concluded: “Journalists feel under siege like never before”.5
The existing attitude towards the media is represented in the outright denunciation of its 
representatives/journalists. Once heralded, even theoretically, as truth tellers and sources 
of reliable information, they are now widely perceived as “unpatriotic elements”. It seems 
that this political “culture” is not only reserved for the US, but has become a modern and 
widespread model for the growing number of “strong”, populist, leaders worldwide. This 
malign attitude toward journalists has emerged in the context of political polarisation 
and a crisis of democracy,6 where there has been a distinct rise in populism and the mass-
support actively given to populist leaders and their parties in Western countries,7 as well 
as “democratic backsliding”.8 The context is shaped by the phenomenon of a post-truth 
paradigm,9 but also by the erosion of the public trust in journalism,10 a clash of journal-
istic authority11 and an erosion of the professional identity12 itself. These factors are not 
the only ones that contribute to shaping the antagonism toward journalists as political 
discourse; rather, they are the framework of the global political perspective that reflects 
within the media itself. 
Although polarisation is generally perceived as a threat to democracy,13 it is equally an 
opportunity to “mobilize society” to act and “achieve fundamental changes in structures, 
institutions, and power relations”.14 A free press, as the fifth estate in its watchdog role, 
the media has been perceived as integral to democracy – which is the reason it has been 
under attack. With the rise of populism, mostly in the Trump and Brexit era,15 the broader 
media scene as a global role model present within Western democracies, may be exported 
to local landscapes worldwide. The rise of populism is not only driven by economic poli-
cies16 but by “cultural backlash”17 and “social policies”18 as well. Local contexts and local 
habits, therefore, also shape populism to the leader’s style and their national context. If the 
 4  Ibid. 
 5  Ibid.
 6  McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018.
 7  Inglehart and Norris 2016.
 8  Dawson and Hanley 2016; Kreuder-Sonnen 2018; Bugarič 2019. 
 9  McIntyre 2019.
10  Selva 2020. 
11  Carlson 2017. 
12  Zelizer 2018.
13  McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 16.
14  Ibid.,16.
15  Inglehart and Norris 2016.
16  Otjes et al. 2018.
17  Inglehart and Norris 2016, 31.
18  Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013.
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antagonism towards journalists and journalism is capable of existing in those countries 
whose institutions remain strong and predictable, there are even fewer barriers to the 
same antagonism in those countries where these institutions are weaker and less reliable.
Despite the continuous decline of the US in the press media index (stemming mostly 
from within the last four years of the Trump administration),19 the United States is still 
perceived as a model of the media’s struggle for rights in countries headed by strong-arm 
leaders. This perception is due to the United States’ strong media-market, the supremacy 
of its system and its institutions toward political representation, as well as the prominence 
and influence of its corresponding media outlets. Journalists have been encouraged, as 
their constitutional right in the United States, to insist on their press freedom – such as 
when a Federal Court ordered the White House to return the press-pass of CNN corre-
spondent Jim Acosta after the Trump administration had revoked it following Acosta’s di-
rect questioning of the administration.20 Applying the First Amendment to social-media, 
the Court of Appeals ruled that President Trump does not have the authority to exclude 
Americans from reading his posts on Twitter and responding to them because he does 
not like their views.21 Regardless, despite all these decisions which indicate legal certainty 
and even though “the National news organizations have adopted grand slogans like ‘De-
mocracy dies in darkness’ (The Washington Post) and ‘The truth demands our attention’ 
(The New York Times),”22 American journalists have seen their position worsen in relation 
to their right to report on political authorities.
Unfortunately, journalism’s shifting position from “watchdog” to “lap dog” has been 
disseminated worldwide amid political, economic and institutional uncertainty. Turk-
ish journalists accused President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of a “media witch-hunt like 
McCarthyism”.23 Independent journalists in Hungary have stated that they “operate in 
a ghetto.”24 This and similar models of accusing journalists of working against the state 
have been replicated in the Western Balkans: the Croatian Prime Minister has accused a 
journalist of being an activist instead of a journalist;25 the Serbian President has accused 
a cable TV station of being instructed both by opposition leaders and by its foreign own-
ership.26 Serbia’s complex relationship between its media and political authorities, where 
“media associations reported that political, economic, and other pressures on journalists 
increased,”27 have taken on a new dimension reflecting a lack of an institutional frame-
19  Reporters Without Borders 2019.
20  Stelter et al. 2018.
21  Savage 2019.
22  Massing 2018.
23  Shaheen 2016.
24  Berardi 2019.
25  N1 2019.
26  N1 2018.
27  European Commission 2019. 
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work, the rule of law and institutional predictability. Serbia has dropped 14 places on 
the World Press Freedom Index in 2019. Within the last five years of Vučić’s premiership 
and presidency, Serbia has become “a place where practicing journalism is neither safe 
nor supported by the state”.28 The number of attacks on the media in Serbia is also on 
the rise, including “death threats and inflammatory rhetoric targeting journalists increas-
ingly coming from the governing officials”.29 While Freedom House has ranked Serbia as 
partly free for the first time in over a decade, it also cited that Serbia “has steadily eroded 
political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media”.30 The Freedom 
House report showed that Viktor Orbán and Aleksandar Vučić succeeded in “snuffing out 
critical journalism, blazing a trail for populist forces elsewhere”.31 Both leaders consoli-
dated media ownership “in the hands of their cronies”, ensuring that “the outlets with the 
widest reach support the government and smear its perceived opponents”.32
This paper aims to shed light on similarities of how populist leaders in the post-truth era 
share attitudes toward journalists. Bearing in mind the global context and its local impli-
cations in weak democracies (such as Serbia), the article will compare patterns in politi-
cal communication toward journalists of the presidents Donald Trump and Aleksandar 
Vučić. These political leaders, while different in their backgrounds and the manner they 
conduct their administrations, share similar methods in how they approach, deal with and 
demonize the media they don’t like. 
Trump, as the president of a significant world power, has legitimized hostile political 
communication against journalists worldwide. Contrary to his previous right-wing, pro-
Russian orientation (since 2008), Vučić has rebranded himself in his rise to power, pro-
claiming his orientation to the EU and other Western-styled democracies, either follow-
ing external pressures from the EU or wishing to be perceived as such. Vučić has openly 
promoted these same trends of open hostility toward the press in Serbia, which therefore 
makes him an appropriate example for comparison. This article addresses the gap be-
tween a rising interest in researching populism and democratization (global and local) 
and research on media capture,33 the role of the media and the media system, especially 
in weak democracies.34 The research comes in a moment of a frequent comparison of the 
communication models of the two leaders in public discourse.35
28  Reporters Without Borders 2019a. 
29  Ibid.
30  Freedom House Report 2019.
31  Ibid.
32  Freedom House Report 2019.
33  Milosavljević and Polar 2018.
34  Mladenov Jovanović 2018.
35  The media adviser of President Vučić compared, on the pro-government TV Pink, the behav-
iour of the two presidents regarding the case of Jim Acosta, explaining that the US President revoked 
the journalist’s press cards, which the Serbian president never did. See: Pavkov 2019.
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This paper is divided into five sections: the first will contextualize the post-truth era in 
order to clarify the new tendencies in politics and the media as well. The second part will 
offer the context of polarization combined with populism and media populism in West-
ern democracies, democratic backsliding and the local landscape. The third part will dis-
cuss the theoretical definition of populism (ideology and style) in order to show that both 
leaders use similar populist techniques of communication. This framework will be used 
to define codes which will be applied to the political communication of Trump and Vučić 
which is at the core of the analysis. In the conclusion, the paper will discuss the results 
found regarding the similarities and differences between the two leaders. 
Post-Truth, Public Opinion and Role of Journalists
The contextualization and understanding of the truth in the era in which we live is crucial 
for this article’s argument. It is paradoxical that, when “truth” may be more accessible than 
ever due to the development of globalized and networked communication, it is actively 
being bypassed by misconceptions, misperceptions and propaganda of outright, easily 
provable lies. These paradoxes are framed by the term “post-truth”, based on the context 
in which “objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to 
emotion and personal belief”.36 The term, which Oxford dictionary proclaimed to be the 
word of the year in 2016, may seem blurred and unclear. Lee McIntyre has stated that 
post-truth:
Amounts to a form of ideological supremacy, whereby its practitioners are trying to com-
pel someone to believe in something whether there is good evidence for it or not. And 
this is a recipe for political domination.37
Post-truth itself is better understood in this context to be defined according to how it 
is presented in political behaviour worldwide. Post-truth politicians generally share the 
characteristic that they “manufacture their own facts”38 and assert “whatever they believe 
to be in their own interest and continue to press those same claims, regardless of the evi-
dence amassed against them”.39 Those who operate in a post-truth era most successfully 
promote an “authoritarian impulse”40 which goes hand in hand with “propaganda, vilifica-
tion and intimidation”.41
36  Oxford Dictionary n.d. 
37  McIntyre 2019, 13.
38  Lockie 2017, 1.
39  Ibid., 1.
40  Lockie 2017, 1.
41  Ibid.
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Natural biases promoted by “filter bubbles” and “echo chambers” that social networks 
help promote42 tend to shape public opinion, which has natural political ramifications. 
As the light of truth is being slowly extinguished, Habermas’s public sphere of “a realm 
of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed”43 has 
been replaced with an “increasingly segmented niche audience”44 and the “growth of niche 
identity groups and the increasing intensity of partisanship politics”,45 whose internecine 
arguments have nearly strangled any effective ability to form critical pressure on political 
authorities. In some cases, journalism has abandoned its role to inform its audience,46 
whereby journalists have contributed to the fragmentation of social discourse, further-
ing division and polarisation of the audience. Polarising the media sphere between me-
dia outlets “for the people” and “for the elite”, following the principle “for the rest and 
the best”, forcing an “opinion dog”47 instead of watchdog journalism, have all contributed 
to a divided and polarised political atmosphere which populists have misappropriated. 
While exercising near aristocratic privileges to criticize journalists, political leaders have 
equated journalists with global capital and private interest groups, which has further in-
duced “deep levels of professional conviction” among journalists.48 What is more, is that 
journalists have become news themselves; they “obtain a central role in media politics 
when it provokes attention back toward itself”,49 creating a narrative and contributing to 
the polarisation between the media, as well as the media and the political establishment. 
Polarisation and (Media) Populism
Just like populism and post-truth, polarisation has become the “new normal”,50 whereby 
old political divides have been replicated into all forms of the political spectrum and mu-
tated into strict social circles based on decided loyalties. According to McCoy, Rahman 
and Somer, polarisation may be defined as:
A process whereby the normal multiplicity of differences in a society increasingly align 
along a single dimension, cross-cutting differences become instead reinforcing, and 
people increasingly perceive and describe politics and society in terms of “Us” versus 
“Them”.51
42  Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic 2015, 1130.
43  Habermas 1974, 49.
44  Pepper 2005, 82.
45  Freie 2012, 323.
46  Coleman, and Morrison 2009.
47  Pope 2019.
48  McDevitt and Ferrucci 2017, 512.
49  Ibid., 512.
50  Block and Negrine 2017, 190.
51  McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 18.
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“Trump’s starkly polarising and anti-establishment, dividing”52 campaign rhetoric is one 
prime example of the utilization of polarisation among political leaders. Deepening the 
process and existing cleavages, Trump’s example goes above and beyond the United 
States, as it “has pernicious consequences for democracy”.53 In the US, polarisation in-
cluding “animosity toward opposition” has been on the rise over the last decade,54 where 
a majority of “voters in 2016 said that people supporting the opposition anger and even 
scare them”.55 Trump exploits these feelings, being a “terrible simplificateur”.56 Domesti-
cally, it divides the voting base ensuring loyal supporters; yet, when applied to foreign 
policy, it worsens international polarisation in which the Trump administration creates 
an international environment of “the U.S. versus others”.57 The extreme use of polarisa-
tion for political purposes results in “fostering cultural and social anxiety among people, 
especially against the media and politicians”.58
Although polarisation risks “instability, democratic erosion and democratic collapse”,59 
its true danger is that it is frequently coupled with populism, a political practice “easily 
instrumentalized by almost any type of ideology”.60 The rise of populism is not merely 
the proclamation of a dominant ideology or dominant style, it seeks for “disintegration”61 
and carries with it “the spectre of authoritarianism”,62 as populism seems to espouse as its 
driving force to “erode the substance of democracy and gradually transform it into various 
forms of illiberal and authoritarian regimes”.63 Populism sustains itself across a national 
phenomenon, linking similar behavioural patterns and forms in local politics, which build 
a “cycle of authoritarianism”.64 Most alarmingly, although populism takes on much flavour 
locally as it varies from country to country, one of its constants is the ineffectiveness of 
institutions to combat them.
Research into democratic factors in Central and Eastern Europe generally cites polarisa-
tion and populism as being the main factors behind democratic backslides. As members 
of the EU have shown that determined populist leaders role back hard-won rights, Hun-
gary and Poland are often cited as prime examples of a “new populism” that combines 
52  Ibid., 18.
53  McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 35.
54  Strandberg et al. 2020, 2.
55  Ibid., 2. 
56  Doner 2019, 125.
57  Ibid., 125.
58  Ibid.
59  Somer and McCoy 2019, 9. 
60  Bugarič 2019, 598.
61  Kreuder-Sonnen 2018, 453.
62  Ibid., 453.
63  Muller, in Bugarič 2019, 599.
64  Kreuder-Sonnen 2018, 453.
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“elements of populism, ethno-nationalism, and authoritarianism”. Although formally EU 
member states, these countries are “increasingly undermined by popular distrust”, con-
sisting of “corrupt and collusive relationships linking business, media, and political elites 
and periodic eruptions of civic anger and anti-elite populism”. Populism is seen elsewhere 
rising in “young democracies”, such as the Western Balkan countries, even if a majority 
of these countries are trying to meet their commitments to join the EU through the pre-
accession process.
Political populism is coupled by “media populism” and the medialization of political com-
munication, in which there is a circular feedback in the media market as it is strongly 
shaped by political circumstances and vice versa. Explaining Trump’s rhetoric in the con-
text of populism and media populism can “clarify something similar that has been hap-
pening in many modern democracies”.65 Elena Block and Ralph Negrine compared Don-
ald Trump to other populist leaders, from Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom, Marine Le 
Pen in France, Pauline Hanson in Australia to Alexis Tsipras in Greece and Pablo Iglesias 
in Spain. The authors conclude that these political leaders all share two qualities: 
They have all been associated with right- or left-wing forms of populism and have been 
recognized for their savvy use of media communication.66
Gianpietro Mazzoleni links populism and the media, claiming that the latter provides 
significant support to the rise of populist phenomena. He concludes that populism shows 
a unique alliance of media and political factors but the main catalyst “may be found in the 
country’s political culture at a given time”.67 The relationship between populism and the 
media is certainly shaped by political culture, but the legal framework in which populism 
arises should also be taken into consideration. 
From the early 1990s until today, young democracies emerging from post-communist 
countries have suffered from a lack of legal institutional supremacy that has supported the 
rise of populism and populist messages. Indeed, post-communist countries have been ac-
tively turning to populism as it is a “natural mode of politics in a country where the post-
communist electorate represents the largest voter segment”.68 The media is both a means 
and a target as any failure to comply with a populist message, whether it is true or plagued 
by falsehoods, results in the media becoming the “victim” of populist leaders. Journalists 
and the media are easy scapegoats since they are not a coherent group or community. The 
issue dividing communities, hence, also drives the polarisation between media outlets as 
they seek to cater to their audience(s). As populists are trying to incorporate direct refer-
ences to “a will of people, opportunism, the construction of moral majority and promise 
65  Rowland 2019, 345.
66  Block and Negrine 2017,178.
67  Mazzoleni 2008, 50.
68  Csigo and Markovity 2017, 302. 
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of state defence against insecurity”,69 the media becomes the target of political ire either by 
1) being accused of derogating the goals of the leader and unpatriotic obstructions; or by 
2) being untrusted as propaganda that furthers the goals of the leader in power.
Numerous leaders around the world have used populism as a “medium of mass 
mobilisation”70 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey,71 Hugo Chavez in Venezuela72 and Viktor 
Orbán in Hungary73 have all utilized communication tools to confirm the link between 
populism and the media. Nevertheless, the “causal connection was never explicitly articu-
lated until recently, specifically in the United States with the rise of Donald Trump”,74 who 
is a new leader among global representatives of populism. Aleksandar Vučić, the Serbian 
president still uses populism to try to promote himself as a democrat after a past political 
history allying himself with anti-democratic forces. The two politicians’ biographies are 
considerably different from one another – Donald Trump is a self-proclaimed conser-
vative businessman who started multiple attempts for the White House without having 
ever held any public office. Aleksandar Vučić, on the other hand, gained prominence in 
politics as a young, right-wing nationalist leader, who switched political orientations to a 
pro-western stance as a move to gain political power. Following Mazzoleni, Block and Ne-
grine’s claims, it may be added that both politicians have been deeply embedded with the 
media for decades: Trump as a reality show magnate keen on media spectacle75 and Vučić 
as the former Minister of Information (1998–2000), which “shaped him as a politician”.76 
Under Vučić’s mandate (in 1998), which was under the authoritarian regime of Slobodan 
Milošević, a Law on Public Information was adopted in order to “defend the country”.77 
Yet, in effect, the law permitted “anybody to be sued for anything”78 under specious libel 
laws.  Therein, these two presidents of the US and the Republic of Serbia show similar 
treatment of their utilization of mass media in that they both originate from the top of a 
fixed pyramid of the political hierarchy.
Possessing previous media experience, both Trump and Vučić know how to amplify their 
messages. Apart from press conferences, Trump has repeatedly amplified his presence 
by taking to Twitter. Vučić, on the other hand, leverages his position through the un-
regulated media market of Serbia.79 On an almost daily basis, he is able to address the 
69  Ibid., 300.
70  Turk 2018.
71  Ibid.
72  Block and Negrine 2017.
73  Csigo and Markovity 2017.
74  Block and Negrine 2017, 180. 
75  Kellner 2016.
76  Mladenov Jovanović 2019, 62.
77  Ibid., 64.
78  Ibid.
79  See: European Commission 2019.
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entirety of Serbia by receiving coverage from all five of its nation-wide broadcast televi-
sion stations. With their media experience, both men know how to address the messages 
to the audience. Should there be any contradictions in their statements, they are excused 
as stemming from the lack of understanding of the journalist or deflected with direct ac-
cusations that the press itself was lying to stir up discord and provocation. As journalist 
Tom McCarthy has noted of Trump: “The president’s tactic of redirecting accusations of 
misconduct back at his accuser is childish, petty … and surprisingly effective”.80
Populism as a Style
In the age of anxiety, “populism” has come to be an oft used, broad term that requires 
clarification. While some authors use populism to “characterise certain political phenom-
ena or brand competitors in a political conflict”,81 most scholars define populism as an 
ideology.82 For Vlastimir Havlik, there are three references to understand populism: 
The perception of the people and elites as homogenous groups, construction of an an-
tagonistic and moralistic divide between the two groups and a view of the people as a 
moral sovereign and the need to restore the allegedly stolen sovereignty of the people.83
Mudde concurs, offering a “minimal definition” that explains populism as: 
A thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homo-
geneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which 
argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the 
people.84
This paper will follow these concepts, but will not discuss populism as an ideology nor 
analyse the types of populism, as this analysis is not a comparison of the programs of 
populist leaders. The analysed samples of the two leaders may be closest to the pattern 
of the “nationalist populism with a charismatic outsider persona”,85 though the paper will 
not discuss the argument that it is an ideology. Populism itself is perceived as a style that 
has no ideology of its own, which necessitates that it must pair with all forms of political 
ideology and is “almost always combined with one or more ideological features”86 and 
has to borrow ideologies from other political platforms. In this regard, populism’s “most 
common values are from other programs and ideologies (left and right populism)”.87 For 
80  McCarthy 2019.
81  Jagers and Walgrave 2017, 4.
82  Ibid., 4.
83  Havlik 2019,13. 
84  Mudde 2004, 562; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 149–150. 
85  Rowland 2019, 356.
86  Atlagić 2017, 121.  
87  Ibid.,121–122.
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the purposes of this paper, populism is used to denote a political communication style88 
of “political actors that refers to the people”.89 The political behaviour and political com-
munication of populist leaders are that they tend to contain the following: “provoke the 
interest of the people, emotional charge, intention to shape the actions of the people as 
well as combination of elements of organized political persuasion”.90 The populist message 
to the public is one of “I listen to you because I talk about you”.91 The populist also accuses 
the media of being its opposite: “I do not listen to you because you are against me”. 
Populists, as political representatives, personalize politics by using specific communica-
tion tools and “persuasive techniques of promoting personal examples based on psycho-
logical principles”92 in order to “shape the behaviour of the people.”93 Populism relies on 
conventions that sow divisions among communities, which leads to a paradox as populist 
leaders try to communicate but must always resort to compulsive categories of “polarisa-
tion on good and/or bad”,94 us and/or them, current and/or previous. Populism takes an 
“anti-establishment stance and stresses the (ideal) homogeneity of the people by exclud-
ing specific population segments.”95 Such exclusions are not the only criteria when analys-
ing the communication style of populist leaders. “Anti-elitism” and “anti-establishment” 
cannot stand alone as exclusive criteria and the exclusive trait of populism as “many radi-
cal political movements in general are driven by anti-elitist attitudes”96 as well as that 
“most scholars consider anti-elitism as a central feature of populism”.97 These exclusions 
therefore lead to the development of an “atmosphere of animosity and mistrust toward 
political elites”.98 Populist attitudes toward political elites and intellectual elites therefore 
naturally form along these lines where the “enemy” is reflected “in the previous authori-
ties (D. Trump, A. Vučić) or some other social groups”.99 Such excluded groups could be 
any group which is perceived as a threat to the system. It may not only be members of the 
political elite itself, but the “media (media tycoons, journalists, etc.), the state (administra-
tion, civil service), intellectuals (universities, writers, professors) or economic powers”.100
88  Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Atlagić 2017; Block and Nagrine 2017.
89  Jagers and Walgrave 2007, 3.
90  Atlagić 2017, 125.
91  Jagers and Walgrave 2007, 4.
92  Atlagić 2017, 124.
93  Ibid., 124. 
94  Ibid. 
95  Jagers and Walgrave 2007, 1.
96  Ibid.
97  Ibid., 4.
98  Stanley 2008, in Atlagić 2017, 120.
99  Ibid.
100  Jagers and Walgrave 2007, 5. 
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The enemy which is “external to the people”101 may also be among them. Journalists are 
one case in point as they may be designated enemies of the people. Hence, populism in 
the media is shown to be “the most evident effect on the transformation of the political 
language into spectacle.”102 Populism and “media populism” complement each other and, 
at the same time, derogate the substance of the two professions (i.e. of being a political 
representative or a media representative/journalist). Both support each other – the lead-
ers offer what the media “needs” while the media produces new populist content shar-
ing: “anti-elitist, aggressive, emotional speech which breaks the boundaries of political 
correctness, controversy and conflict, charismatic and highly personalized leadership”.103 
Arguing an issue which is shaped by controversy and demonization may be followed by 
intimidation of the other. This is articulated with a specific style, an “act of speech” using 
the:
…words, signs, and images – forms of communication – to connect with the people (the 
disenchanted, disadvantaged, aggrieved groups mentioned) and demonize the Other, 
usually the centre-ground elite, or the establishment.104
The political communication of populist leaders is coloured emotionally. Their speeches 
and the messages they address are intended to engage emotions. The populists use the 
affective logic in which “feelings precede intellect”105 offering “perceptive argumentation 
(argumentum ad oculum), pseudo arguments (insinuation and labelling and personal dis-
qualification (argumentum ad hominem)”.106
This style of communication feeds on divisive issues, aggressiveness, controversy and 
conflict. By its frequency, it is already perceived as a “new normal”.107 As such, this “new 
normal” has become a model in many countries around the world. Populist leaders draw 
the legitimacy of their behaviour based also on the frequency of the phenomena. 
Like other populist leaders, Donald Trump is keen on dividing, following “principles” 
of the “real” part of society and the Other in a spectrum of race, gender and identity.108 
These divisions drive its potential from the division of Us and Them, aliening the Other, 
perceiving the media outlets as one of Them, as “he feels attacked by media elites”109 (see 
the “dividing” criteria below). 
101  Ibid., 4.
102  Atlagić 2017, 134.
103  Ibid., 133.
104  Block and Negrine 2017, 180.
105  Atlagić 2017, 125.
106  Ibid.
107  Block and Negrine 2017, 190.
108  Rowland 2019, 349.
109  Rowland 2019, 357. 
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Following these principles, he is keen on arguing with his enemies and having the oppor-
tunity to address the political elites and media outlets at his press conferences. In most 
of his speeches (reflecting an entire message or focused on an “aspect of the dystopian 
landscape”,110 elites and the media are “omnipresent villains whose corruption allowed the 
Other to undermine the nation”.111 As he has had opportunity to “speak” with the media 
at press conferences, he addressed the media outlets he doesn’t like which are perceived 
as representative of the corrupted elite. Expressing “anger against elites, the media, immi-
grants (which plays) a crucial role in Trump’s rhetoric and success”,112 Trump is in a con-
stant polemic and disagreement with its representatives (see the “arguing” criteria below). 
The speeches of President Trump are coloured emotionally, as his populism “does not 
serve an epistemic but rather an affective function”,113 provoking an “emotional response”.114 
His language is simple, low-graded and colloquial, addressing a wider audience.115 His 
speeches promote “political anti-intellectualism”.116 The rhetorical pattern of othering and 
his policy serve to “generate additional fear”117 and the purpose of the fear is “internal in-
timidation as a basic mode of social and political control” (see the intimidation criteria).118
Donald Trump uses the media (and media platforms) to address his messages, attack 
the “enemies”, argue with them and bond with his voters. As he uses the social networks 
frequently, he presents himself as a representative of open and direct communication 
with citizens, “testing every aspect of free speech, beginning with the importance of the 
truth”.119 At the same time, his speeches at rallies and press conferences are resistant to 
fact-checking and argumentative critiques and even have “little influence on his affective 
relationship with core supporters”.120 Faced with fact-checking, arguments or questions, 
he feels attacked as he had attacked “the out of touch media elites”,121 which frequently al-
ter into a form of “an Other to hate, elites to blame, and a hero to idolize”122 (see the “open 
for speaking, not to debate” criterion).
110  Ibid., 359.
111  Ibid.
112  Rowland 2019, 347.
113  Ibid., 346.
114  Ibid.
115  Kayam 2018, 86.
116  Ibid., 76.
117  Goodman 2017, 152.
118  Robin in Goodman 2017, 152.
119  Caplan 2018, 25.
120  Rowland 2019, 346–347.
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Even though he is a representative of business elites in the US, Trump uses his populist 
rhetoric to present himself as a representative of the voiceless against “the immigrants, 
minorities, and liberal elites who had wrought an American carnage”.123 His “anti-elitist 
populism”, based on the “frustration expressed against elites as the others”, is combined 
with “excluding populism – the exclusion of dangerous others, such as immigrants”.124 In 
the case of the media, his anti-elitism is strongly focused on elite media outlets (see the 
“anti-elitism” criteria).
Methodology
This paper seeks to analyse the specific style of the political communication of Donald 
Trump toward journalists and to try to find similarities in the pattern of this commu-
nication model with that of the Serbian President, by answering the research question: 
What are the similarities in the style of political communication between Donald Trump 
and Aleksandar Vučić? The main hypothesis is that: The populist political leaders the US 
president Donald Trump and Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić have the same style of 
political communication, which is mostly reflected through their attitude toward journal-
ists. The hypothesis will be operationalized with the following analytical categories. First, 
this communication style consists of labelling journalists on the basis of the media outlets 
they work for or by arguing on a personal level with reporters contributing to a division 
between “friendly and unfriendly media”. Second, the style insists on the existence of fake 
news when trying to avoid giving a clear and direct answer to a journalist’s question, and 
in this, the leaders are abusing their position (as representatives of all).
The approach in this article will be to analyse twelve press conferences of the two leaders, 
six for each of them, from 2016 up to 2019, following four steps. In the first section, the 
article will detect the unique communication style of Donald Trump using five criteria 
derived from the theoretical framework of the populist communication style. These five 
criteria will be applied and explained in a case study of a significant, extreme conference 
at the White House about the midterm elections (7 November 2018). Then, these five cri-
teria will be also applied to the rest of the sample of Trump cases (The press conferences 
of the 16 February 2017; 1 October 2018; 21 August 2019; 25 September 2019; 2 Octo-
ber 2019). These press conferences are chosen for their specific interactivity, the existing 
tension or conflicts that are expressed between the US President and the journalist for a 
media outlet. That does not mean these are the only conferences with such conflict, but 
the six of them were chosen to represent the president’s particular political communica-
tion style.
In the following section, the article will analyse the political communication of the Ser-
bian president Aleksandar Vučić. The same five criteria will be applied to the extreme, 
123  McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 30. 
124  Elçi 2019, 390.
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significant case of the press statement in confrontation with N1 reporter (18 October 
2018), a sample which will help to demonstrate the style of communication that was used. 
The five codes will be also analysed in the rest of the chosen cases (24 January 2017; 24 
February 2017; 16 January 2018; 23 March 2019; 26 April 2019).125
Drawing upon the literature discussed above, Trump’s style of political communication 
is characterised by the following five criteria. The first criterion is the “dividing issue” – 
as the leader is keen on dividing between the good and bad (people, journalists, media 
outlets) with the attitude that good supporters behave kindly toward him/his policy and 
bad supporters do not. The second criterion is the “arguing issue”, as the leader is keen on 
arguing about various subjects, perceiving questions as attacks, and is in constant defence 
by offending those seen to be in disagreement. The third criterion is the “intimidating” 
issue, explained as being keen on labelling and referring to something personal or private. 
The fourth criterion is being “open to speaking but not for debate”, meaning seemingly 
inclusive in communication, but factually exclusive to those he shares an opinion with. 
The fifth criterion is named “chosen by people, anti-elitist”, by highlighting the perception 
that the leader has been chosen by the voiceless, supported by the voiceless which bolsters 
his legitimacy, in contrast to an elitist, contributing to the division of elitist/anti-elitist, 
intellectual/anti-intellectual.
The analysis is based on twelve press conferences, including media statements, chosen for 
their unique interactivity, tension and conflict with media representatives. It is important 
to highlight the differences in their communication with the media – while the Serbian 
president makes statements almost every day, the American president is more inclined to-
wards communication over Twitter, paralleled with press conferences. All Trump’s press 
conferences that are analysed below are taken from the official transcription of the White 
House (the White House briefings). The names of the journalist were used only in cases 
where it was necessary for understanding the context, as the official transcriptions do not 
contain the name of the journalist and media outlets. All the transcriptions in the Serbian 
case were made and translated by the author of this article. 
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Donald Trump’s Communication Style
The significant case that will be used in the example of Donald Trump is the press confer-
ence at the White House about the midterm elections (7 November 2018). This confer-
ence can be divided into three points: arguing with CNN’s correspondent Jim Acosta, 
replying to PBS NewsHour reporter Yamiche Alcindor and commenting on NBC reporter 
Peter Alexander and April Ryan, National Urban Radio Network’s White House reporter. 
On the first point, CNN reporter Jim Acosta asked President Donald Trump about the 
migrant caravan that Trump had classified as an “invasion”. Acosta questioned why the 
President classified it as an invasion and also asked if the President demonized the mi-
grants. Trump answered:  
CNN should be ashamed of itself, having you working for them. You are a rude, terrible 
person. You shouldn’t work for CNN. You are a very rude person. The way you treat Sarah 
Huckabee (ed. White House press secretary) is horrible. The way you treat other people 
is horrible. You shouldn’t treat people like that.126
After the White House staff took the microphone from Acosta’s hand, reporter Peter Al-
exander from NBC, challenged the president’s characterization, calling Acosta a “diligent 
reporter”. Trump cut him off: “I’m not a big fan of yours, either”. President Trump then 
turned back to Acosta, who was still trying to ask a question (about the Russian investiga-
tion) and said: “When you report fake news which CNN does a lot, you are an enemy of 
the people”.127
At the same conference, Trump accused PBS NewsHour African-American reporter 
Yamiche Alcindor for asking a “racist” question when she questioned whether the presi-
dent had used the word “nationalism” in the sense of the meaning of “white nationalism”. 
Trump answered: “I don’t know why you’d say that, that’s such a racist question”.128Alcindor 
asked: “There are some people who say that now the Republican Party is seen as support-
ing white nationalists because of your rhetoric, what do you make of that?”.129 Trump 
answered: 
I don’t believe — well, I don’t know. Why do I have my highest poll numbers ever with 
African Americans? Why do I have among the highest poll numbers with African Ameri-
cans? I mean, why do I have my highest poll numbers? That’s such a racist question. 
Honestly, I mean, I know you have it written down, and you’re going to tell me. Let me 
tell you: It’s a racist question.130
Trump also added: “Excuse me. But to say that — what you said is so insulting to me. It’s 
a very terrible thing that you said”.131 At the same conference, Trump told the National 
Urban Radio Network White House correspondent April Ryan to sit down when she at-
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This conference was an extreme and significant example of the five criteria which char-
acterize Trump’s political communication. The dividing issue is represented in Trump’s 
willingness to declare a journalist/media outlet to be an “enemy of the people” (CNN case) 
and is an example of being either for America/Trump or anti-America. His communica-
tion is followed by his strong division based on the perception of journalists as being 
either friendly or unfriendly. All three examples show a willingness to argue with media 
representatives including his expression of power, which is shown by taking away the 
microphone from a journalist’s hand by a White House staff member. The intimidating 
issue is seen in the argument with CNN reporter Jim Acosta, which started with Trump 
insulting the reporter on a personal level, using language like “bad, horrible person”, and 
by telling the NBC reporter he was “not a big fan of his, either”. This also contributes to the 
dividing issue, as “not being someone’s fan” means being an “unfriendly journalist”. In par-
allel, giving journalists the opportunity to speak and to ask questions doesn’t mean they 
will have an opportunity to answer and follow up, which accurately correlates with the 
lack of debate, related to the “open to speaking but not for debate” issue. The “chosen by 
people, anti-elitist” issue is seen in Trump’s reply to the PBS reporter, which consisted of 
the clear statement of being supported by people (from African-Americans to the “white 
nationalists in the Republican Party”) when the question was asked, while Trump’s ques-
tioning of this issue resulted in his labelling the reporter as racist. 
Trump’s division, based on the line against-me/fake and pro-me/true, can be found in al-
most every case which was chosen for the sample of analysis. His dividing issue is strongly 
pointed against CNN and similar media outlets that support Democrats, and the presi-
dent does not hesitate to point to this out in his speaking points: “We would be a far 
greater when we don’t have the CNNs of the world, who are corrupt people”.132
The arguing issue, which is widely present in his press conferences, is complemented with 
his disqualification of journalists/media and his use of accusation without offering any 
evidence. The constant accusation that journalists disseminate fake news (see the first 
case) is followed by the accusation that they are dishonest, unprofessional or corrupt: 
People like you and the fake news media that we have in this country. And I say, in many 
cases, the corrupt media – because you’re corrupt. Much of the media in this country is 
not just fake, it’s corrupt.133
Besides all the divisiveness that he contributes to, dividing the friendly and unfriendly, 
pro- and anti-America reporting, enemies and allies, in addition to his expressed and 
direct arguing with journalists, Trump’s political communication includes the intimida-
tion of journalists on a personal level. His desire is to “find a friendly reporter”,134 on the 
basis: “Wait, let’s see, who’s - I want to find a friendly reporter. Are you a friendly re-
132  White House 2019b.
133  Ibid.
134  White House 2017. 
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porter? Watch how friendly he is. Wait, wait - watch how friendly he is. Go ahead”.135 The 
intimidating issue based on Trump’s perception of what a reporter looks like had its roots 
in Trump’s candidacy for president. For example, during the electoral campaign, Trump 
pointed out ABC News reporter Tom Llamas and called him “a sleaze”, told CNN reporter 
Jim Acosta “he is real beauty”, called Fox News host Megyn Kelly “a bimbo” and character-
ized NBC’s representative Katy Tur as “little Katy, third-rate journalist”.136
Personal altercation is seen in remarks such as “by the way”, speeding up the asking of 
questions, interrupting by teasing “should I let him speak?” or comments like “She’s 
shocked that I picked her. She’s in a state of shock,”137 followed by the laughter of his cabi-
net. These are typical communication tools that help undermine the journalist’s position 
and right to ask. Personal insults come as a differentia specifica of Trump’s political com-
munication and contributes to lowering the respect towards the targeted journalists and 
the media itself. The example below shows this more precisely: 
President Trump: Okay, question. Yeah. Go ahead. Sure. She’s shocked that I picked her. 
She’s like in a state of shock.
Reporter:  I’m not. Thank you, Mr. President.
President Trump: That’s okay. I know you’re not thinking. You never do.
Reporter:  I’m sorry?
President Trump: No, go ahead.138
Trump is keen on debate, but without facing any rules of argumentation and debate. Even 
though he is in a position of supremacy in the speaker’s place in front of the camera, he 
will stop the journalist when he finds it appropriate or by telling him or her to “sit down”139 
or be “quiet, quiet, quiet”.140 His relations with the media are inappropriate on several lay-
ers. Even though he came from the media industry, he finds the media outlets to be “liars” 
and he doesn’t hesitate to express that even from the public stage of the White House. The 
case of a Jewish journalist who tried to ask a question shows his lack of regard for basic 
media rights:
Journalist: What we are concerned about, and what we haven’t really heard be addressed 
is an uptick in anti-Semitism and how the government is planning to take care of it. There 
have been reports out that 48 bomb threats have been made against Jewish centers all 
135  Ibid. 
136  See more: Byers and Diamond 2016.   
137  White House 2018a. 
138  Ibid.
139  White House 2018. 
140  White House 2017. 
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across the country in the last couple of weeks. There are people who are committing anti-
Semitic acts or threatening to… 
President Trump:  You see, he said he was going to ask a very simple, easy question. And 
it’s not. It’s not. Not a simple question, not a fair question. Okay, sit down. I understand 
the rest of your question. So, here’s the story, folks. Number one, I am the least anti-
Semitic person that you’ve ever seen in your entire life. Number two, racism – the least 
racist. Quiet, quiet, quiet. See, he lied about – he was going to get up and ask a very 
straight, simple question. So, you know, welcome to the world of the media. But let me 
just tell you something – that I hate the charge. I find it repulsive.141
But, just for a comparison, Trump’s perception of a “friendly” and “nice” question was one 
that referred to the positive aspects of the activities of his spouse Melania Trump.
Journalist: And she does a lot of great work for the country as well. Can you tell us a little 
bit about what First Lady Melania Trump does for the country? And there is a unique 
level of interest in your administration, so by opening the White House Visitors Office, 
what does that mean to you?
President Trump: Now, that’s what I call a nice question. That is very nice. Who are you 
with?142
In light of the context of Trump’s candidacy, it might be said that he is the first US presi-
dent with such an anti-campaign in the strong media such as the New York Times, the 
Washington Post and CNN, especially compared with the relation that those media had 
with President Obama. But he relies on Fox News, pulling his legitimacy from the Fox 
media outlet and the influence it has with Trump’s base. But, although becoming the 
president of all Americans, he has continued his policy of arguing with the “elite” media 
and accusing them of spreading fake news. Making comparisons between the fake and 
unwanted is an additional point that has shaped his political communication, by labelling 
the unwanted media market as fake news,143 both at press conferences and on his Twitter 
account. He is free to express his comments, but he is open only for limited debate. His 
anti-media attitude matches with his anti-elitist attitude and both are present in almost 
every segment of his remarks to the audience. In a populist’s way, he likes to point out his 
excellency in a variety of occasions (even in the presence of other foreign officials), em-
phasizing that the media has created the fake picture of himself. 
President Trump: I don’t like the concept of releasing calls because when a president or 
prime minister, or a king or a queen, calls the United States, you don’t like to say, ‘Gee, 
we’re going to release your call to the fake-news media, and they’re going to make you 
look like a fool’. What happens is, it’s hard to do business that way. You want to have 
people feel comfortable. So, I hated it, but you folks were saying such lies, such horrible 
things about a call that was so innocent and so nice. In fact, Lindsey Graham said to me, 
when he read it – it was very interesting. He’s a good man. He’s a smart man. He said, ‘I 
141  White House 2017.
142  Ibid.
143  White House 2018.
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can’t believe it.  I never knew you could be this, really, nice to a person’. He said, ‘I cannot 
believe it. You were so nice. I didn’t think you had that in you to be so nice. I was nice. 
I’m nice to a lot of people. People don’t understand that. But I was. But he was shocked 
that it was such a nice call. There – he said, ‘There is nothing here’ And all fair people say 
the same thing.144
These 6 press conferences show the unique style of Trump’s communication that is based 
on (at least) these five criteria. It is a divisive communication that alienates the specific 
media outlets (but not only them), with strong intimidation towards the journalists and a 
tendency to argue emotionally rather than to offer relevant argument. His rhetoric is col-
loquial, with simple language, but his messages are directly addressed to critique media 
outlets as the representatives of the anti-Trump base. This approach goes beyond an insti-
tutional type of communication between the political representative (of the nation) and a 
particular group, forcing its exclusion while eroding democratic principles.  
Aleksandar Vučić’s Communication Style
To analyse the communication power of Vučić’s speeches and its correspondence with 
Trump’s type of political communication, the article will first analyse an extreme, signifi-
cant example as in Trump’s case, and then continue with pattern codes found in the rest of 
the case studies. On one occasion of his regular conferences and more, when giving press 
statements, Vučić focused his attention on the subject of the conference and then dis-
cussed all other topics. The statements after “official events” are frequently used to send 
messages to his supporters and his “enemies” (the opposition, journalists, or representa-
tives of other countries). In a great number of cases, the press statements after a particular 
event gain more publicity than the event itself. 
President Vučić: How many times have you, Miss Stojisavljević145 or your colleagues from 
TV gone to the rooms of Vuk Jeremić146 to cry for a statement by Milenko Jovanov.147 So 
you didn’t go to cry to the Informer,148 because Dragan Đilas asks to arrest the Informer’s 
editor in chief? 
Journalist N1: Please, let me beg you two things: First, not to put pressure on journalists 
in public service like you just did. Second, to start to refer to our media house by our 
name, N1. For months, you have called us ‘Đilas’s and Šolak’s TV’. Šolak has part owner-
ship in N1, but Dragan Đilas has nothing to do with our media outlet. So, I’m asking you 
to treat us professionally as we treat you. Is that okay? 
144  White House 2019a.
145  A journalist from RTS, public service.
146  A leader of the opposition party, married to Nataša Jeremić, ex. RTS anchor and editor.
147  Ruling party member (Serbian Progressive Party) who accused that Nataša Jeremić that she 
“mangages the entire drug market in Serbia”. Nataša Jeremić sued Milenko Jovanov, the Serbian Pro-
gressive Party and its leader Aleksandar Vučić in court. 
148  A pro-government tabloid.
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President Vučić: Do you have a question?
Journalist N1: Yes, I do. If Serbia finds itself paralyzed because Kosovo forms an army, 
what will be Serbia’s response?
President Vučić: I was trying to behave professionally despite the fact that you have never 
been professional. It is the uncomplimentary word referred to you, from my side. To you, 
the direct representative of Dragan Đilas. Do you want to forbid me to think? Who are 
we? Who has a right to tell me what I may do and what I may not – or are you going to 
open a ‘commission for hanging’, because I don’t think the same as you do? About Šolak 
and Đilas, you are right, there is no written proof that he is the owner, officially on paper. 
He is owner of Direct Media and a company in Bulgaria, which was bought by Šolak. 
They are owners of a company on Malta, also. Is this the truth? It is! Just to help people 
understand who is lying and who tells the truth. Šolak and Đilas are together in all the 
businesses they do. They are selling to one another […] Did Šolak pay 10 million euros to 
buy a building from Đilas? But you don’t like to talk about facts. But you like to treat me 
like a punching bag because I don’t have the opportunity to defend myself on your TV. 
When I have the opportunity to tell the truth – the truth suffers! I’ll call you what you 
want, but I would not miss the opportunity to say that it is Šolak’s TV with Đilas’ max 
political influence. The people will decide.149
These cases will be analysed in a same way as Trump’s extreme case was. When the divid-
ing issue criterion is concerned, we see that Vučić made a clear distinction between “the 
supporters” of N1 as a corrupt elite and himself. He also made a distinction between a 
media outlet and journalist as a “liar” and himself as the one who speaks the truth. He un-
derlined the people’s will to decide to support the truth contrary to the “lies published by 
media outlets”. The president first openly argued with an RTS journalist. Later, he accused 
an N1 reporter of wanting to “treat him like a punching bag”, to form a “commission for 
hanging”, and of “not telling the truth”. This falls under the criteria of the arguing issue, but 
also slips into the intimidating issue. When he stresses the (unproven) evidence that the 
RTS reporter “cried in the office of the opposition leader”, he derogates her position. At 
the same time, his references to the journalist as unprofessional and coming “direct from 
the office of the opposition” are personal attacks which correspond to the intimidating 
issue criteria. The fourth criteria can also be applied as the president stressed that he was 
open to being asked but instead of answering, he offered accusations without valid proof, 
calling on the people “to believe” him. Pointing to the will of the people to decide who is 
telling the truth and stressing that he is “happy because neither the Americans, nor Šolak 
nor Đilas decide what he should think” are examples of the populist pattern “chosen by 
people” and the “anti-elitist” criteria. 
There are a lot of examples here that fall under the dividing issue, in this highly polar-
ized media scene. Vučić also perceives media outlets as either friendly or unfriendly, but 
in the local context one must keep in mind the disproportionate nature of the cover-
age – when obligated to promote all sides of the process, the public media service in 
its news programs not only promotes the position of the ruling party and its leader, but 
149  Press statement, Belgrade, October 18, 2018.
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they are constantly accused of not promoting it appropriately (see European Commission 
Report). The national airwaves are used by “friendly” media outlets (according to a non-
transparent ownership that has lasted for almost a decade), while several research outlets 
(BIRN, KRIK, Istinomer) and N1, a cable operator limited in its distribution, is perceived 
as unfriendly. The tabloids also maintain a pro-government orientation, while the news 
magazines, although with limited coverage, promote a critical media orientation. All this 
disproportionate coverage comes from an unregulated media market that has lasted for 
decades, with unclear media ownership and a strong media connection with the state or 
the ruling party’s financing. 
The next example of Vučić’s sarcastic reply to the media confirms this: 
Everyone has to be like N1. It is the only example of professional journalism; if they are 
not like N1 just shut it down. Shut down Prva TV, Pink, B92, all! Only theirs is good. 
Luckily, I have never been there, thank God.150
The division issues are obviously prima facie, but they are also confirmed in almost every 
press conference where the president, answering a question, refers to “your supporters”, 
or “the ones you like” willing to criminalize the connection between financiers and media 
outlets, without offering any proof from an institutional investigation. When, in October 
2018, the Serbian government spent seven days in the south of Serbia, workers of the 
failed state companies in Niš were promised that their salaries would be paid to them. Five 
months later, the journalists of Istinomer and N1 Television asked the president why this 
promise was not fulfilled, but before his answer, he again labelled them foreign mercenar-
ies who advocated for the interests of “those of yours”: “The companies broke down in the 
time of people you are supporting”.151 When asked by the journalist from Istinomer why 
he constantly labelled and humiliated journalists who dared to ask him questions, Vučić 
replied: “You humiliate me by interrupting me constantly and because you want to make 
a case. You came from Belgrade to do that; you will not succeed in that”.152  This was fol-
lowed by personal references: “Why are you annoyed – it’s not going well for the ones you 
support?” When the reporter asked the president why he “humiliates journalists who ask 
a question” he answered: “You humiliate me by frequently interrupting. You want to make 
a case. You came from Belgrade to do that”.153 The dividing issue is a permanent feature 
and incorporated into almost every answer related to “unwanted” media outlets. 
President Vučić will say that the media outlet “is lying”,154 that it bases its media agenda 
on anti-Vučić policy,155 but he will also use the dividing issue when he wants to escape an-
150  Press statement, Novi Sad, March 23, 2019. 
151  Press statement, Niš, February 24, 2017. 
152  Ibid. 
153  Ibid. 
154  Press statement, Belgrade, October 18, 2018. 
155  Ibid. 
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swering the question. As in Trump’s case, the permanent reflection on the media ground, 
asking a journalist to put himself in his shoes and to decide is a useful tool to avoid an 
answer and pass on to the irrelevant. When a journalist asked him to comment on an old 
picture of his Minister of Health Zlatibor Lončar with the criminal Dušan Spasojević, 
involved in the assassination of PM Zoran Đinđić, the president answered: 
What do you think about the photo of the ones you support who sell and distribute drugs 
to our children? And these have become the main bosses of their campaigns, you support 
them every day.156
As was obvious from the previous examples of the dividing issue, the arguing issue is 
dominantly manifested in most of his press statements and all statements in the sample. 
As in Trump’s case, the journalist was accused of constantly interrupting: “Stop interrupt-
ing me, don’t be rude, you did it five times”,157 even as his answer might divert to the irrel-
evant within his extended media statements on a daily basis. A strong journalistic attempt 
to get an answer to a specific question might turn into a reflection or accusation for inter-
rupting. Arguing the issue is widely present, but in most cases, it would be hard to un-
derstand without the whole context, because most of the answers consist of accusations, 
without referring to specific cases and offering specific proofs. The answers and messages 
are difficult to understand even for the journalist, if they are not completely aware of 
the context which is made of stories published in tabloids and on pro-government com-
mercial TV. Messages that are sent during the debate with the journalist or separately are 
“surprisingly effective” as Tom McCarthy said while explaining Trump’s argumentation: 
“When accused of this, or revealed to have done that, Trump simply blurts ‘she did it’ or 
‘he’s guilty’, whatever the charge may be”.158
When comparing the intimidation issue found in Trump’s rhetoric, there are differences 
in the type of communication between the two presidents. While Trump uses his position 
to humiliate journalists even on a personal level, Vučić does not insult journalists in the 
same way. He argues with them or underrates the media outlet’s journalist for their work:
Can you do me a favour. Please take your gossip and rumours to my late grandma Višnja, 
about your alleged suspicions to the police and tell them.159 (on the question of the mur-
der of the opposition leader in Kosovo, Oliver Ivanović).
 He rudely refers to a journalist’s work by saying, “stop flaming”160 or “you made it up”,161 
even when the journalist quotes his previous statements. But, contrary to Trump’s ten-
dency to intimidate and offend on a personal level, Vučić’s political communication does 
156  Press statement, Belgrade, January 24, 2017.
157  Press statement, Niš, February 24, 2017.
158  McCarthy 2019. 
159  Press statement, Belgrade, January 16, 2018.
160  Press statement, Belgrade, March 23, 2019. 
161  Press statement, Belgrade, May 24, 2019. 
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not contain such examples. Vučić presents himself as the personal protector of journal-
ists. For example, when the government-friendly Studio B reporter Barbara Životić was 
verbally attacked because of her biased reporting, the president promoted himself as her 
protector saying: “Barbara is a lovely kid, say hello to her, she is a young child”.162
Vučić, in theory, does not refuse to answer the media’s questions (third code, open for 
questions); more precisely, following the examples that were the subject of this analysis, 
he permits all media outlets to ask questions but does not offer relevant answers. In most 
cases there is no debate, the answers are reflections on the media content or arguing with 
media representatives. He presents himself as a representative of “polite people in Serbia” 
also calling party members “to be polite while answering the media even when being at-
tacked by the media”,163 because there is no such thing as a “cheeky, ruthless question”, just 
a “stupid answer”,164 but their behaviour shows the opposite. He frequently points out that 
he will answer all journalists’ questions, which he does, but that doesn’t mean there will be 
a coherent answer to every question. He gives an opportunity to the journalist to ask the 
question, but he doesn’t reply with an answer to the question, if he doesn’t want to. But it 
should be kept in mind that media outlets are not a coherent group. Pro-government out-
lets have made an effort to contribute to these divisions, blindly accepting whatever the 
government does, not only by expressing the opinion in the “factography”165 or by sharing 
biased attitudes and personal emotions when reporting, but also in accusing the other 
outlets and other non-likeminded of creating diversions against the state. 
These relations contribute to undermining the journalists’ position, but the strong divi-
sion between “Mine” and “Yours”, put the journalist in a dangerous position in the fragile 
Balkan political landscape where escalation of violence is possible on a daily basis, es-
pecially in tense regions such as Kosovo. On the decision that the Serbian list sent from 
Belgrade,166 was not permitted to participate in Kosovo’s election, the president accused 
a journalist, positioning them on the side of the “others”, even though they are already in 
a dangerous position working besides two unregulated systems, between Belgrade and 
Pristina: 
But they are against the idea of the Serbian list winning the elections. They have invested 
a lot of money to destroy the Serbian list and divide it from Serbia. Look how much 
money they invested in creating the media in the north of Kosovo. How many foreign 
media were created, Westerners created them in the north of Kosovo, only to destroy 
the reputation of the Serbian List. See all the campaigns that are being conducted for 
the criminalization of northern Kosovo. And they did nothing […] Organizing a media 
agency network, especially in the north of Kosovo, millions of dollars are being paid and 
162  Press statement, Belgrade, December 9, 2018. 
163  TV Happy 2018.
164  Ibid. 
165  Jevtić 2016, 57.
166  The list of the Serbian representatives who participated in Kosovo’s election, instructed and 
supported by the Serbian officials from Belgrade.
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this becomes your main information which providers in Central Serbia, and in many 
other places directly paid off, just to overthrow the unity of the Serb people in the north 
of Kosovo and Metohija and in other parts of Kosovo and Metohija, too.167
In such a media scene, in a poor and unregulated media industry market,168 the reflec-
tions of the president’s behaviour are deeper and invasive not only to the media, but to 
the society. It is not only part of the communication strategy but a strategy directed at 
non-like-minded in every pore of society which further leads to accusation and division 
at all levels. Like Trump, Vučić promotes himself as a president with high support, chosen 
by the people. His anti-elitism expressed in media statements (“Westerners created the 
media”,169 glad not to be instructed “by Americans”170) are also expressed in his editorial in 
the Politika newspaper, with the headline “Elite and plebs”171 in which he addresses those 
who criticize him: 
The last days in the ubiquitous campaign of belittling everyone who thinks differently 
from those in Serbian society, who have imagined that, for some reason, they belong to 
an elite, thinking, socially and mentally emancipated stratum of society.172
This article contributes to extreme divisions in Serbian society, marking and expressing all 
the differences, creating irony and insulting the “elite” from the President’s point of view. 
Conclusion
Following global trends in a post-truth era in all aspects, it is obvious that the truth, as 
Daniel Boorstin said, “gave way to faith”,173 so frequent lies and semi-lies could be easily 
placed as official narrative. Instead of Chomsky’s appeal to “question everything”, journal-
ists are put in the position to not ask questions about anything, because they might be 
accused of subversion. The examples of both extreme cases represent the way the two 
leaders treat the media as such. The extreme cases may stand alone in showing patterns 
of populism in the political communication of the two presidents, but also similarities in 
their communication styles. Even though journalists are obliged to “recognize a special 
obligation to serve as watchdogs over public affairs and the government and to seek to 
ensure that the public’s business is conducted in the open, and that public records are 
open to all”,174 none of these criteria is being respected, permitted or possible in any of the 
examples outlined here. 
167  Press statement, Belgrade, April 26, 2019.
168  Milosavljević and Polar 2019.
169  Press statement, Belgrade, April 26, 2019.
170  Press statement, Belgrade, October 18, 2018.
171  Vučić 2019.
172  Ibid.
173  Boorstin 1992.
174  Society of Professional Journalists 2014.
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The analysis of communication models of the US President Donald Trump and the Serbi-
an president Aleksandar Vučić reveals the similar communication pattern, shaped in the 
particular contexts of each country. Both presidents are keen on the dividing issue, creat-
ing the perception of friendly and unfriendly media, but more, all these media perceptions 
impact a society as a strongly divisive issue. Being pro-government is equated with being a 
patriot, pro-state. Being critical is equated with needing to be instructed and representing 
an anti-state element that is strongly against of everything that the president or govern-
ment does (using pro-government in the Serbian case refers not only to Government 
representatives but to the strong political area that the president makes decisions on). The 
strong polarization of the society is followed by strong controversy, which both presidents 
are keen on maintaining. They use most of their opportunities to argue with the press 
– President Trump at his press conferences followed by strong and frequent communi-
cation on his Twitter account, while President Vučić uses his power to be broadcasted 
almost every day in his press statements on different occasions. The press conferences at 
the White House are limited to several questions that might be asked, so the journalists 
that have an opportunity to ask the question feel “selected” and “chosen”. In the Serbian 
case, the majority of the journalists at the ad-hoc press conferences/statements have the 
opportunity to ask a question, as the statements last until the last question, in most cases. 
This does not mean that all the journalists will get a proper answer, as the answer might 
be diverted to the irrelevant. In both Trump’s and Vučić’s cases, the critical media outlets 
are accused of being instructed – by “foreign” forces or by the “opposition” in the Serbian 
case, which corresponds to Trump’s “enemy of the people”. 
Following the criteria on the intimidating issue, there are visible differences within this 
communication model. While Trump would label a journalist on a personal level, as be-
ing a “terrible person” or “sleazy”, president Vučić would not permit himself to do so. As 
he is a former nationalist now willing to foster the EU accession process, he is trying to 
present himself as calm and not affected by the journalist’s questions, even though his de-
scriptions of media outlets and non-like-minders correspond with Trump’s insults. Vučić 
argues with journalists, telling them that they are instructed, that they lie and fabricate 
their stories even when they quote his own words. He provokes journalists for “being an-
noyed”, “being profiteers of the foreign or criminal-opposition money”, but he does not 
deliver personal insults the way Trump does. Yet these two post-truth politicians use the 
same tools, guided by the same pattern, such as asking journalists to put themselves in his 
shoes or to “advise” him what to do. 
As has been said, there are differences in the opportunity to ask (from press conferences 
to press statements) and getting a relevant answer. Those circumstances are based on dif-
ferences in the two countries’ political systems, the media market and also in the media 
culture. In the end, as the last criterion, both presidents have a populist self-perception 
which assumes that they are “chosen by the people” in a struggle to fight against a previ-
ously unfair system shaped by corrupt or limited-minded political elites, even though 
both of them are actually representatives of the political and/or business establishment. 
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Even the presidents use a similar populist communication model, the main difference is 
that Donald Trump is more oriented toward intimidation on a personal level than Alek-
sandar Vučić, according to the analysed sample. The differences in their communication 
pattern are shaped by different personal backgrounds, but also by the media landscape 
and the rule of law. The populistic pattern of Vučić’s communication, directed at a frag-
mented, corrupted, controlled and weak media market, indicates the weaknesses of local 
democracy. Hence, this research might be used for other comparisons of communica-
tion models of populist leaders in the Western Balkans region, as well as in CEE and 
throughout the rising right-wing populism found in Western Europe. In addition, this 
paper might be useful for research that seeks to analyse the process of democratization 
and anti-democratic development in the region, as well as the success of the EU accession 
monitoring process, following the media as a relevant indicator of democratization. 
Our representatives at the highest level contribute to divisions globally and locally, deep-
ening the gap among the media as well as among the citizens. This does not mean that 
media outlets today are the best that they could be. But, the attitude towards their media 
watchdog role is something which should not rely on personal whim, but be institution-
ally framed, indicating that leaders show their limited capacities and a lack of awareness 
of the institutional framework.
In spite of their personal attitudes or whether they are satisfied with the professional-
ism of the media, political leaders do have a responsibility toward journalists, both as 
guardians of the public interest and as members of the community they represent. The 
perception of journalists as enemies of the system can lead to a particular reluctance in 
society that allows a level of arbitrariness at all levels. If we look back on McCarthy, the 
fear of communists is embedded in their constant accusations, very similar to the fear of 
journalists, while accusing them of defying the public interest. A system that permits such 
arbitrariness is a system that can easily slip into authoritarianism. 
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